The Employer's Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 ("the 1969 Act") provides that an employer is negligent if "an employee suffers personal injury in the course of his employment in consequence of a defect in equipment provided by his employer for the purposes of the employer’s business; and the defect is attributable wholly or partly to the fault of a third party (whether identified or not)”. The judgment in the case of Chuhan v Dechert LLP handed down on 11 April 2025 is one of the very few that considers what amounts to "equipment" within the meaning of the 1969 Act.
The facts
The claimant was employed by the defendant as a solicitor. On 21 November 2018, as the claimant was leaving her employer's café, she pulled a door handle towards her and the top of the handle detached from the door and struck her on the head. Following the accident, a maintenance engineer inspected the handle, noting that there was nothing wrong with the fittings or the threaded recess in the handle itself and reattached the handle using the same fittings. He was satisfied that it was secure. The handle had been in-situ for some 13 years when the accident occurred and there was no evidence that it had been removed or replaced in the interim and no faults were recorded in the defendant's defect reporting system.
The claim had significant potential value, the provisional schedule of loss indicating that the claim for loss of earnings alone would amount to a seven figure sum.
The issues
The court was required to determine whether the handle and door constituted work equipment within the definition of the 1969 Act. The claimant did not raise any allegations of negligence against the defendant, nor were any allegations concerning the inspection or maintenance of the door made.
The burden lay with the claimant to prove the door and handle constituted "equipment" within the meaning of section 1(1) of the 1969 Act. The claimant alleged that the screw that was used to secure the top part of the handle to the door was too short, and the thread of the screw itself was damaged.
The arguments
The claimant's case was that the door and its handle were “equipment” within the meaning of the 1969 Act and that the handle was defective because a third party had been negligent in failing to use a screw of the correct length. It was also alleged that the threads of the screw had been damaged. The defendant denied that the screw was of insufficient length and disputed that the threads had been damaged. The handle had been serviceable for 13 years and there was no evidence that it was not secure when installed or that it had been negligently maintained post installation.
The defendant contended that the handle and door were not work equipment and therefore the 1969 Act did not apply. Section 1(3) of the 1969 Act specifies that "'Equipment' includes any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing". There is little authority on the interpretation of the 1969 Act, and the judge was taken to previous decisions including Coltman v Bibby 1988 AC 276 (which considered whether a ship came within the scope of the word "equipment"), Mason v Satelcom, 2008 EWCA Civ 494 (a ladder), PRP Architects v Reid 2007 ICR 78 (a lift), and Heeds v CC of Cleveland Police 2018 EWHC 810 (the latch and frame of an electronic locking door).
The defendant argued that a door such as that involved in this claim should be regarded as part of the premises and not a piece of equipment. The structure of a building and the fixtures within it formed part of the workplace but were not "equipment" within the definition of the 1969 Act.
It was common ground between the parties that if the claimant was unable to establish that the door was "equipment" within the meaning of the 1969 Act then the claim failed.
The judgment
The judge, HHJ Berkley acknowledged that there was very little authority on what constituted "equipment" within the definition of the 1969 Act (and none since the coming into force of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 ).
The door that was the subject of the claim was not unusual. The judge noted "that such doors are not generally regarded as “equipment"" and that there were "intrinsic difficulties with describing a plain and ordinary door used in an office building as “equipment”. It is not used in the course of a solicitor’s employment save as part of the building in which that solicitor is employed… it cannot really be said that the door is somehow part of the process of providing legal advice". The door and handle formed part of the building and were not distinguishable items of work equipment.
As a result, the claim was dismissed.
Epilogue
This decision provides guidance to practitioners when dealing with similar claims:
- It provides greater clarity about what constitutes "equipment" within the definition of the 1969 Act.
- It confirms that the courts will look at the nature of the claimant's employment when determining whether an item is work equipment within the definition of the 1969 Act.
- It provides confirmation that doors form part of the material of the building and are not "equipment".
When considering "equipment" claims in the future, practitioners should bear in mind that not everything that a person comes into contact with during the course of their employment is "equipment" within the meaning of the 1969 Act.
DAC Beachcroft Claims Ltd (Partner Emma Jackson and Associate Laura Ascough) acted for the defendant and it's insurers. Andrew McLaughlin of St John's Chambers represented the defendant. The claimant was represented by Marcus Grant (counsel) instructed by Slater & Gordon Lawyers.
Our Casualty Injury Team deals with claims like this on a regular basis. For more information or advice, please contact one of our experts.
